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mind not so much substantive issues as the Court's oversight role in 
insuring the administration of justice in the lower courts. Although 
the Court's mandate is to decide real cases involving real parties, 
issues-not always of overwhelming importance-appear to deter-
mine case selection at the expense of opportunities to correct occa-
sionally egregious errors by lower federal courts in cases that may 
have unexciting, narrow, or non-constitutional issues, but are, for 
the parties, once-in-a-lifetime experiences in the federal courts. 
My final suggestion is in a different vein. We need more ana-
lytical and empirical scholarship on punitive damages. Such dam-
ages affect several of our most cherished ideals: a government of 
laws not of men; equal justice under law; procedural fairness in the 
administration of the law, especially in its punitive aspects; and ac-
countability of governmental institutions. 
MARK TUSHNETs 
For over a decade constitutional law scholarship has been liv-
ing off the remains of the Warren Court. Liberals nostalgic for the 
era of Supreme Court assistance in the promotion of their political 
programs grasp at anything that demonstrates the Court's present 
inclination to continue providing such assistance. Conservatives 
parade the bogey-man of "judicial activism" -such as invalidating 
the death penalty-as if the Court had not "deregulated" the field, 
in Professor Weisberg's apt phrase. The incarnation of Justice 
Lewis Powell, a very conservative judge, as a judicial moderate 
upon his retirement is symptomatic-and not a little embarrassing 
when it turned out that the views of his designated successor, who 
was attacked as an extreme conservative, were not that different 
from Powell's. 
Of course people can delude themselves indefinitely, and schol-
arship about constitutional law that treats Warren Court decisions 
as canonical and later ones as aberrational may well persist. There 
are sociological reasons for that to occur as well. The legal acad-
emy is likely to remain dominated by liberal scholars, whose polit-
ical inclinations will lead them to define their field in politically 
congenial ways. That's because the opportunity costs for conserva-
tives who go into academic life are much higher than the opportu-
nity costs for liberals: put bluntly, I'd have to take a substantial cut 
in pay to do the kind of legal practice that I would be inclined to do, 
but conservatives have to take substantial cuts in pay when they 
leave the kind of legal practice that they are inclined to do. 
8. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
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My utopian aspirations for the academy make me want to hope 
that reality will at some point intrude on constitutional law scholar-
ship. What will happen when people realize that the Warren Court 
ended a while ago? 
The most likely result is that the same kind of scholarship will 
be produced, with people simply switching sides. Liberals will start 
chastising the Supreme Court for failing to take serious account of 
the historical background of various constitutional provisions, for 
disingenuously dealing with precedents, for promoting its political 
agenda under the guise of enforcing the Constitution-all the things 
that conservatives have been attacking the Court for doing. And 
conservatives, few though they may be, will start saying that, 
although the Court's precise reasoning may have been somewhat 
inadequate, the result it reached can be defended along different 
lines. 
This prospect is deeply depressing. Part of the problem is that 
the critiques of liberal decisions are so well-developed, and so obvi-
ously correct, that they can be deployed against any decision invali-
dating legislation. If conservatives were willing to follow through 
on their inconstant commitment to a populist majoritarianism, only 
one such critique would be available-that populist majoritarianism 
is inconsistent with the idea of constitutionalism. But the moment 
that they invalidate a statute-campaign finance regulation, affirm-
ative action programs, legislation aimed at restricting the mobility 
of capital (plant-closing statutes)-conservatives are just as bad off 
as liberals, because everything they have said about liberals in the 
past can then be said about them. 
There are already indications that this is going to happen. One 
would not have thought it possible for conservatives to rely on a 
worse historical understanding of the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses than liberals have, but they have managed to apply 
their jurisprudence of original intent to the religion clauses in just 
that way. And Laurence Tribe would have no difficulty in agreeing 
with the assertion that television broadcasters and other commer-
cial speakers are protected by the first amendment because we have 
to understand the purposes of the amendment on the right level of 
generality. Those who contend that affirmative action programs are 
unconstitutional sound like Ronald Dworkin in asserting that we 
have to interpret the equal protection clause in light of the concept 
of racial equality that it embodies, not in terms of the particular 
conceptions of equality held by its framers (who, after all, supported 
quite race-specific laws such as the Freedmen's Bureau statutes). 
This prospect is depressing because it is not a lot of fun watch-
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ing people shoot fish in barrels; indeed, one sometimes begins to 
develop sympathy both for the fish, who are doing the best they can 
in trying circumstances, and for their pursuers, who are doing the 
only thing they know how to do. In addition, it may be difficult to 
sustain the enterprise over the long run. We have already exper-
ienced the extrusion of certain subtopics from the field of constitu-
tional scholarship: criminal procedure first, followed by a large part 
of the law of justiciability. I am told that many people already have 
abandoned teaching about the powers of Congress and federalism 
more generally. Oddly, the first two areas have been eliminated 
from the constitutional law course because there is too much law, 
while federalism may go because there is too little law about Con-
gress's powers and too much law about the negative commerce 
clause and preemption. (You would have to be a pedagogical 
genius to be able to teach an introductory class the CTS case.) 
If federalism were extruded from the constitutional law course, 
constitutional law as an academic field would consist of civil rights 
and civil liberties. (I haven't done the necessary research, but I do 
note that 1102 of the 1536 pages in the constitutional1aw casebook 
of which I am a co-author-about 72%-deal with those issues, 
and would bet that if one looked back a decade or two one would 
find that percentage substantially lower in the casebooks then in 
use.) But constitutional law isn't very interesting when the Court 
routinely upholds legislation; I suppose that is one of the reasons 
why National League of Cities v. Usery gave federalism as a field of 
study a shot in the arm, and why Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority is likely to deaden the field again. Given the 
likely composition of the Court in the future, civil rights and civil 
liberties cases will probably begin to resemble today's federalism 
cases-routinely upholding legislation. (There is one exception: 
the Justices, no fools about public relations, will occasionally up-
hold claims under the first amendment, to get the plaudits of the 
press that such decisions inevitably generate.) If that happens, con-
stitutional scholarship focused on the Supreme Court will have to 
deal with presumptively uninteresting subjects-the cases. 
Are there any alternatives to this grim picture? 
One possibility is that constitutional law scholarship might 
turn away from its obsession with the Supreme Court. I think this 
is unlikely and perhaps even unwise. 
Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson have been arguing for years, 
without substantial success, that constitutional law is made else-
where than in the Supreme Court or even in the courts at all. The 
area of separation of powers seems to me a prime candidate for a 
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study of constitutional law in which the courts figure not at all. (Do 
you think that your students are fairly equipped to write a memo-
randum to a conscientious Senator describing how the principle of 
ambition counteracting ambition applies to her consideration of a 
nominee for the Supreme Court?) Yet, the market is quite resistant 
to suggestions that Youngstown, Chadha, and the like are really not 
the best way to learn the constitutional law of separation of powers. 
Honestly, do you really think that you would assign and be capable 
of teaching from a constitutional law casebook that didn't include 
Youngstown as the heart of its presentation of separation of powers? 
At present I have no substantial thoughts on how the law of civil 
liberties and civil rights could be studied and written about without 
a focus on the Supreme Court, but I bet it could be done. 
Perhaps, though, it should not be done. In recent years schol-
ars of constitutional law have produced a substantial body of work 
in which the Supreme Court doesn't really play much of a role. I 
have in mind the application of moral philosophy to constitutional 
law. This body of work does not encourage one who thinks that 
lawyers should look elsewhere than the courts for enlightenment 
about constitutional law. The difficulty is that legal academics 
think that you can throw a little "equal concern and respect," a 
little Wittgenstein, a little whatever-else, into the pot, stir carefully, 
and come up with something that we should regard as real philoso-
phy. This is the current version of what I once called the "lawyer 
as astrophysicist" assumption: We are people who have a genera-
lized intelligence, and can absorb and utilize the products of any 
other discipline in which we happen to become interested. One has 
to read no more than the work of serious philosophers like Thomas 
Nagel in The View from Nowhere or Derek Parfit in Reasons and 
Persons to appreciate how embarrassingly amateurish our pseudo-
philosophical efforts are. 
What follows should perhaps be taken with some suspicion, 
given my preceding comments about the use of philosophy in recent 
constitutional scholarship. It may be that a useful terrain for con-
stitutional scholarship would retain the focus on the Supreme 
Court, but begin to treat the cases as empirical phenomena rather 
than normative statements. This is, in my view, a job for intellec-
tual historians, and maybe we will be as incompetent at intellectual 
history as we have been at philosophy. Still, I wonder who else 
might address a question like this one, which has puzzled me re-
cently: How come the Supreme Court has become attracted to rela-
tively formalistic analyses of separation of powers questions (but 
not entirely so, as Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. 
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Schor shows; shooting this particular fish involves making fun of the 
fact that Schor and Bowsher v. Synar were decided on the same day) 
when such formalism is not apparently as attractive elsewhere in 
the law? The project would involve trying to figure out the relation-
ship between formalism-pragmatism and conservatism-liberalism 
(not meaning to suggest by this construction that the parallelism is 
accurate) in the present period. 
The overall difficulty for constitutional law scholarship is that 
its producers, by our specialized training and our inclinations, are 
much better at dealing with Supreme Court cases than we are at 
doing anything else. Perhaps people with interdisciplinary train-
ing-in philosophy, political science, or history-will come up with 
some novel perspectives on constitutional law. Yet I note a struc-
tural impediment to the realization of that possibility: With rare 
exceptions, interdisciplinarians at or near the top of their other dis-
ciplines are unlikely to want to teach in a law school, preferring the 
company of those immersed in the other discipline. That means 
that, again with rare exceptions, people who do constitutional law 
scholarship and have interdisciplinary training or interests are un-
likely to produce truly provocative work drawing on that training 
or interest. 
In my view, the lines of analysis of the cases have just about 
played themselves out. Maybe the time has come to start doing 
something else. (Of course, I may be willing to say that because I 
have just published a book on constitutional theory that I unsur-
prisingly but undoubtedly erroneously regard as the last word on 
the subject, and maybe all that I mean is that the time has come for 
me to start doing something else.) 
CHARLES A. LOFGREN9 
In view of the past fifty years of history under the Constitution, 
I find it difficult to think of many-if any-areas of American life 
not open to further examination by constitutional scholars. Cer-
tainly historians, whose domain is perhaps broader than that of 
their constitutional cousins in other disciplines, should greet the Bi-
centennial with renewed appreciation for Andrew McLaughlin's vi-
sion in 1935: "Constitutional history ... , when viewed in its 
entirety, is of almost limitless extent, because to comprehend it fully 
one must have in mind social and industrial change and move-
ment." Indeed, recent decades have suggested that McLaughlin 
9. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna 
College, and member of the Graduate Faculty in History of the Claremont Colleges. 
